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IMAGINING THE PAST AND REMEMBERING
THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
by Gerard V. Bradley*
I. INTRODUCTION
What people believe to be ultimately true forms the core of their
"religion" and affects, if it does not control, every significant decision
they make.1 Moreover, the perception of an ultimate truth begets a per-
sonal moral code that determines how people treat other individuals
and how they define their social duties. Whether it be through the Ten
Commandments, 2 the Golden Rule,3 or some other tenet of faith, per-
sonal morality often supplants society's own assignment of duties
through its law. Religion thus stands in a superior relation to positive
law. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has made this primacy of con-
science the sine qua non of its definition of religion as "a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent.
' '4
The political significance of religious belief does not end, however,
with the public repercussions of these individual private decisions.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. Besides directing purely spiritual life and governing sundry matters of lifestyle, religion
influences such decisions as choice of a spouse, how many spouses one may have, how marital
obligations are defined, the size of a family, selection of a profession and selection of schools for
one's children. See P. TILUCH. DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1957). P. Ti.ucit. TmE COURAGE To
BE (1952). This is effectively the definition of "religion" adopted by the Supreme Court. See
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.l 1 (1961) (neither state nor federal government "can
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs"). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (The task of local
draft boards in reviewing applications for conscientious objector status is "to decide whether the
beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of
things, religious.") (emphasis added).
2. The Ten Commandments is an enumeration of rules of law given in the Old Testament by
God to Moses. See Exodus 20:1-17 (King James).
3. "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to
them: for this is the law and the prophets." Matthew 7:12 (King James).
4. United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163, 176 (1965).
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Many contemporary societies understand themselves and their relation-
ship to the world in almost exclusively religious terms.5 Even the great
twentieth-century movement of atheism confirms the public importnce
of faith through the continuing efforts of communist states to capture
or annihilate religion. Thus, just as the solitary religious adherent per-
ceives his fate through the interpretive medium of faith, religious belief
can contribute to a collective social consciousness.
In America, collective political activity has been an intensely reli-
gious enterprise. Americans have traditionally joined political parties
and voted for public officials according to church membership and reli-
gious belief.6 It is impossible to disentangle great nonpartisan political
movements such as abolitionJ the creation of a free public school sys-
tem,8 prohibition,9 and the civil rights and antiwar movements of the
1960s10 from their religious underpinnings. More recently, the partici-
pation of clergy and religiously motivated lay persons in the controver-
sies surrounding the issues of abortion, sanctuary for illegal aliens, and
apartheid highlights how religion can become entangled with public
policy.
11
5. Israel and various Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are obvious examples of the
more conventional or traditional theistic accounts of religion. Properly added to these mainstays
are countries with state churches (such as Ireland) and countries such as Lebanon, where compet-
ing religious sects vie for the political identity of the country. More important is the observation of
Langdon Gilkey that if religion is conceived (as in Seeger) as simply a set of symbols connoting
ultimate values, then all coherent societies see themselves as religious operatives in history. See L.
GILKEY, SOCIETY AND THE SACRED 15-25 (1981).
6. See R. KELLEY. THE CULTURAL PATTERN IN AMERICAN POLITICS 31-46 (1979): P.
KLEPPNER, THE THIRD ELECTORAL SYSTEM. 1853-1892 at 143-97 (1979); McLoughlin, The Role
of Religion in the Revolution: Liberty of Conscience and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation,
in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 197 (S. Kurtz & J. Hutson eds. 1973).
7. See C. GRIFFIN, THEIR BROTHERS' KEEPERS: MORAL STEWARDSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES.
1800-1865, at 152-97 (1960).
8. See V. LANNIE. PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS passim (1968); D. TYACK & E.
HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE PUBLIC SCHOOL LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, 1820-1980 passim
(1982).
9. See KLEPPNER, supra note 6, at 336-49.
10. The leadership of clerics such as Martin Luther King, Jr. (in the civil rights struggle) and
the Berrigan brothers (in the antiwar protests) illustrates the centrality of religious beliefs to those
struggles.
11. The Catholic Church's involvement in the pro-life movement has even been noted by the
Supreme Court. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980). For clerical involvement in
the "sanctuary" movement (itself a religious concept), see the N.Y. Times, April 18, 1986, at 10,
col. 1. Defendants in the chief government prosecution so far include two Catholic priests, a nun
and a Protestant minister. Furthermore, Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for example, is the
leading black opponent of apartheid in South Africa, and Reverend Leon Sullivan is perhaps his
leading ally in the United States.
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It may be assumed that when people associate politically for their
common good, they will consider religious beliefs, customs and prac-
tices as proper subjects of legislation. 12 Indeed, America's founding
generation, which commonly interpreted its political experiences
through Christian theology,13 is no exception to this rule. Thus, it is not
intuitively apparent why the Supreme Court maintains that the framers
intended to erect a "wall of separation between church and state"1 "
that forbids encouragement and support of religion by either the states
or the federal government. 15 The Court's assertion that these conclu-
sions are mandated by the first amendment's establishment clause 16 is
12. Indeed, this is what people have almost universally done. The notion of a "separation of
church and state" is possible only in societies that: (1) have clearly demarcated the "sacred" from
the "profane," and therefore have defined religion as something that embodies only the former.
over and above everyday occurrences; (2) have a "state" in the Western sense that is clearly
distinguished from "society" and "culture," a concept of state which begins only in the sixteenth
century, see C. GEERTZ NEGARA 121-22 (1980); and, (3) have institutionalized religion into
something called a "church." These notions converge only in recent Western history. Such a sepa-
ration has only been thought desirable since the advent of twentieth century Western secularism.
13. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
14. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1, 16 (1947). The notion or a "wall" between church
and state was articulated in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association in
1802 and first used by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145. 164 (1878)
("I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should 'make not law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state."). Reyn-
olds involved a polygamy prosecution of a Mormon. The defendant unsuccessfully claimed that
such a prosecution was prohibited by the first amendment's free exercise clause. See Infra note 16.
Everson was the first case under the first amendment's establishment clause to employ the "wall"
metaphor, and the first since Reynolds to use it at all.
15. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. (Justice Black's opinion for the Court held that the establishment
clause "means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
16. The religion clauses of the first amendment to the Constitution provide that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." US. CONsT. amend. I. Justice Frankfurter wrote fourteen years after Everson that
the establishment clause
[w]ithdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific.
but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some
transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress
may not make these matters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any legis-
lature in this country. Neither the National Government nor, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may, by any device, support belief or the
expression of belief for its own sake, whether from conviction of the truth of that belief,
or from conviction that by the propagation of that belief the civil welfare of the State is
served, or because a majority of its citizens holding that belief, are offcnded when all do
not hold it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.




Despite this doctrinal confusion, the Court's prohibition of aid to
religion is unquestionably the cornerstone of the modern American con-
stitutional law of church and state. First formulated in the landmark
case of Everson v. Board of Education,1  this prohibition on any aid to
religion, even if the aid does not discriminate among religious groups, is
purportedly based on historical evidence."8 But the doctrine of Everson
is inconsistent both internally and with other establishment clause
cases. Although all nine of the justices in Everson agreed that the es-
tablishment clause prohibits aid to religion, a majority of the Court
decided that publicly funded transportation of parochial school children
to classes did not "aid" religion.1 9 Later cases presenting similar fac-
tual scenarios are almost impossible to reconcile with this result in Ev-
erson.20 This inability, or unwillingness, of the Court consistently to
apply its own doctrinal conclusions suggests that its church-state doc-
trine is either incompatible with reality, ill-conceived or both.2 1 But the
vidual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and
entanglement may be inevitable, lines must be drawn."). See also Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. Id. at 8-14. Since Everson, some members of the Supreme Court have conceded that the
case relied on some "analytical untidiness," Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring), and have admitted that the wall of separation has become a "blurred, indis.
tinct and variable" barrier. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
19. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. This irony prompted Justice Jackson to observe in his dissent:
"The case which irresistably comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'--consented.'" Id. at 19.
20. The result in Everson is particularly difficult to reconcile with a later case that held that
publicly funded transportation of parochial school children on field trips did aid religion. Wollman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977). It thus seems that the "no-aid" theory has come to mean
"some aid" in practice. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing a publicly funded
Nativity scene); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (allowing tuition tax credits for parents of
parochial school children); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (allowing
direct student grants for church-related colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (al-
lowing tax-exempt bond assistance for construction at church-related colleges); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (allowing federal construction grants for church-relatce colleges); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (allowing real property tax exemption for religious organi-
zations); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (allowing textbook loans). In Wolman, the
Court also allowed public funding of parochial schools of standardized tests and scoring services;
speech and hearing diagnostic services; medical, dental, and optometric services; remedial educa-
tion services; programs for the handicapped; and guidance and counseling services. Wolman, 433
U.S. at 238-51.
21. At least eight of the nine current justices have expressed dismay and exasperation with the
Court's church-state doctrine. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255-66 (1976) (where five
justices entered separate concurrences or dissents). "Our decisions in this troubling area draw
lines that often must seem arbitrary." Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
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Court continues to subscribe to the broad teachings of Everson as evi-
denced by the emergence of the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man22 as the relevant inquiry in establishment clause jurisprudence.
Thus, the Court's entire church-state doctrine embodies a single unify-
ing norm that is simply a restatement of the Everson injunction: that it
is judicial business to keep the public realm of law separate from the
private world of religion.23
This article subjects the Court's justification for a general prohibi-
tion on aid to religion, as formulated in Everson, to the test of histori-
cal truth. After examining historical evidence, the article concludes
that the rationale of Everson is fatally flawed and that the first amend-
ment was ratified at a time when "the general, if not the universal
sentiment in America was that Christianity ought to receive encourage-
ment from the state, so far as was compatible with the private rights of
judgment, and dissenting in part). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.. concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court's cases from 1982 to 1984 contributed to the sense o confusion and
futility surrounding the current doctrine of church and state. For more than a decade o establish-
ment clause litigation, the Court had unfailingly applied the three-pronged test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). That test creates a series of requirements that any legislative
enactment must meet in order to satisfy the establishment clause. "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion. . . finally, the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Then, in a series of cases from 1982 to 1984. the Court
seemed to waiver in its commitment to the Lemon test. Compare Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983) (eschewing the Lemon formula) and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (ignoring
the Lemon test) with Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (ostensibly applying Lemon while
approving a tuition tax credit scheme) and Larkin v. Gretels Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982)
(noting that "this Court has consistently held that a statute must satisfy [the) three [Lemon]
criteria to pass muster under the establishment clause"). The tax credit scheme approved in Muel-
ler seems indistinguishable from that struck down under Lemon a decade earlier in Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Finally, the majority in Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Rhode Island Nativity scene case, was unwilling to be
confined by any particular establishment clause analysis, remarking only that it was often "useful
to inquire" into secular purpose, primary effect, and entanglement. Lynch. 465 US. at 679. The
wall of separation had become nothing more than "a useful figure of spcch probably deriving
from the view of Thomas Jefferson." Id. at 674. In each of the more recent 1984-1985 term cases,
however, the Court has unequivocally affirmed the continued vitality of the Lemon criteria. See.
e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985);
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479
(1985).
22. See supra note 21. The doctrine of Everson is particularly apparent in the Lemon test's
command that no law shall have the primary effect of "advancing" religion.
23. See Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A Privatization Theory of the Religion Clause Cases. 30
ST. Louis U.L.J. 275 (1986).
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conscience and the freedom of religious worship."*4 The article asserts
that, rather than envisioning a general prohibition on any aid to reli-
gion, the founders simply intended to assure that religion would be
aided only on a nondiscriminatory, or sect-neutral, basis.23
II. Everson's ACCOUNT OF THE FRAMERS' INTENT
Professor Sutherland wrote in 1962 that Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation has "become the most influential single announcement of the
American law of Church and State." 28 The truth of that assessment
has become increasingly apparent.
The various opinions in Everson are steeped in historical detail,
each traversing the same path and drawing the same doctrinal conclu-
sions.2 Justice Black, writing for the majority, began by recounting the
religious intolerance and persecution the colonists carried with them
from Europe to America. 28 These attitudes became so commonplace, he
said, that the people were driven to outlaw "assist[ance] [to] any or all
religions" through passage of the first amendment.2 9 Although conced-
ing that "no one group" could claim a monopoly on the creation of the
first amendment, Justice Black essentially reduced the religion clauses
to a federal codification of Thomas Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom," the denouement of the 1784-85 Virginia contro-
versy over public stipends for Protestant clergymen.30 The "no-aid"
stricture of Everson is thus firmly grounded in, if not directly modeled
on, Jefferson's statute. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, pursued the Vir-
24. 3 J. STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1868 (Da
Capo ed. 1970).
25. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS TODAY (Greenwood Press, forthcoming
in 1987).
26. Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25, 31 (1962).
27. Justices Jackson and Rutledge dissented in Everson. Although Justice Rutledge generally
agreed with the majority's version of the historical origins of the establishment clause, he dis-
sented because
the matter is not one of quantity, to be measured by the amount of money expended.
Now as in Madison's day it is one of principle, to keep separate the separate spheres as
the First Amendment drew them; to prevent the first experiment upon our liberties; and
to keep the question from becoming entangled in corrosive precedents.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 63.
Rutledge believed that the first amendment "forbids any appropriation, large or small, from
public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises." Id. at 41.
28. Id. at 8-10.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 11-13. Jefferson's bill was in opposition to the renewal of Virginia's tax for the
support of its established church.
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RELIGION AND THE LAW SYMPOSIUM
ginia analogy with still more vigor, and differed from the majority his-
torically only by assigning Jefferson a lesser role in the larger scheme.
Justice Rutledge ostensibly broadened the inquiry to include the pro-
ceedings of the first Congress, and concluded that the amendment was
the "compact and exact" summation of the views of its author, James
Madison."1
The historical Everson analysis is pivotal because of the Court's
ultimate conclusion that the original intent behind the establishment
clause was a general prohibition on aid to religion. The plain language
of the clause was certainly no ally of the justices in their endeavor. The
Court has resolutely, even proudly, rejected the most accessible and
reasonable definition of the words "respecting an Establishment of reli-
gion." 32 As Blackstone said, "By establishment of religion is meant the
setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring
upon one church of special favors and advantages which are denied to
others. 3 3 The Everson Court expressly eschewed such a "narrow inter-
pretation," however, and instead found an intention to uproot and ex-
tinguish all traces of religion in politics and all connection between
church and state.34 Whatever the validity of their handiwork, it is at
least clear that the plain and truly original meaning of nonestablish-
ment has long since ceased to exist.
III. THE FOUNDERS' WORLD VIEW
Despite the Everson Court's analysis, what the congressional fram-
ers and state ratifiers intended through the establishment clause was
that no religious group or sect should be preferred over another. In fact
the founders intended that the establishment clause, together with the
free exercise clause, would tolerate nondiscriminatory aid and support
31. Id. at 37. Justice Rutledge even appended to his opinion the complete text of both
Madison's Memorial and the proposed taxing bill to which it was opposed. Id. at 63-74 app. See
also supra note 30 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jcfferson's opposition to the bill.
32. 330 U.S. at 15 ("There is every reason to give the same application and broad interpreta-
tion to the 'establishment of religion' clause.").
33. 1 BLACKSTONe's COMMENTARIEs 296 (Tucker ed. 1803 & reprint 1969). Even modern
dictionaries define "establishment" as a state church, such as the "Church of England" or
"Church of Scotland." See. e.g., III THE OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 298 (1933); WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 778 (3d ed. unabridged 1981).
34. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 ("Neither a state nor the federal government ... can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."); Id. at 31-32 ("The
Amendment's purpose ... was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support for religion.") (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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of religion. That the first amendment merely conditioned the manner in
which government could aid religion, rather than banning all aid, is a
distinction that has unfortunately eluded the Supreme Court. It did not
elude Justice Story, who realized that, at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, "[a]n attempt to level all religions, and to make it a
matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have cre-
ated universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation."38
The "general, if not the universal sentiment" of the country, as
perceived by Justice Story,36 was rooted in a pair of related premises
that produced an indelible fusion of nondenominational Protestantism
and republican government in the early American mind. First, early
Americans perceived Protestantism as the consummation of religious
development. In the eighteenth century, "most Americans believed that
Protestant Christianity had gathered up within itself the excellences of
the Old Testament and, having cleansed itself of the corruptions of Ro-
man Catholicism, now englobed the 'great fundamental principles' of
religion. ' 37 Perhaps the most appealing characteristic of Protestantism
was its individualism in matters of conscience.38 This spiritual individu-
alism combined with the political republicanism of the era to generate
a single public philosophy. The belief was that "Protestantism, in reli-
gion produc[ed] republicanism in government."39
Second, religion was at the heart of the framers' search for what
Madison called a virtuous citizenry. 0 The experimenters in liberty
knew that virtuous habits and traits were essential to self-government.
As Justice Story put the question: "It yet remains a problem to be
solved in human affairs, whether any free government can be perma-
nent where the public worship of God, and the support of religion, con-
35. J. STORY, supra note 24.
36. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
37. E. SMITH. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (1972).
38. A Protestant criticism of Catholicism was that conscience, "the court of God, was usurped
by pope and priest." Id. at 102-03.
39. H. BUSHNELL, Crisis of the Church, in I HORACE BUSHNELL PAMPHLETS I, 11 (1835)
(quoted in SMITH, supra note 37, at 104). Benjamin Rush of Pennsylvania, signer of the Declara-
tion of Independence and zealous social reformer, once wrote that "[r]epublican forms of govern.
ment are the best repositories of the Gospel. I therefore suppose they are intended as prelude to a
glorious manifestation of its power and influence upon the hearts of men." I LErrERs OF BENJA-
MIN RUSH 611 (L. Butterfield ed. 1951) (letter of Rush to Elhanan Winchester of November 12,
1791). Similarly, a newspaper correspondent wrote in 1789 that Protestantism was the "Bulwark
of our Constitution." Gazette of the United States, May 6, 1789, at 1. In short, eighteenth cen-
tury Americans viewed the United States as party to a national covenant with God. This cultural
hegemony of "republican Protestantism" did not end until the twentieth century.
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 456 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
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stitute no part of the policy or duty of the State in any assignable
shape.""41 It is certain that Madison and others in the founding genera-
tion saw religion as a unifying force in government. It is literally ex-
pressed in countless legislative acts, including the Northwest Ordinance
passed by the first Congress.4 2 Just as certain is that most of the fram-
ers individually could not separate "virtue" and "morality" from
"religion." 4 3
This intellectual infrastructure demonstrates why the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the framers' intent is not only incorrect but
implausible. Where Protestantism and Americanism were conjoined in
the popular mind, a wall of separation-what Paul Freund defined as
the "mutual abstention of the religious and political caretak-
ers" 44-- was simply impossible. If one recognizes the framers' belief
that liberty depended on faith, one cannot say that they erected a con-
stitutional barrier against promoting religion.
41. R. BAIRD. RELIGION IN AMERICA 116-18 (1844) (quoted In SMITH, supra note 37, at 107).
One commentator sees this as the theoretical question posed by the creation of the American
republic. See G. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUIC, 1776-1787. at 428-29
(1969).
42. "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." I Stat. 52 (1789).
43. In his farewell address in 1796, George Washington said:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality
are indispensable supports . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that
morality can be maintained without Religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence
of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us
to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
35 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON 229 (United States George Washington Bicentennial Commission
ed. 1940). Reasoning almost precisely the same as Washington's induced Richard Henry Lee to
support the 1785 Viriginia general assessment for the support of the established church. 2 THE
LErrERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 304 (1914) (letter of Lee to James Madison of Nov. 26, 1784).
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of this assessment. John Adams
thought that "religion and virtue are the only foundations, not only of republicanism . . . but of
social felicity under all governments and in all the combinations of human society." 9 TIlE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 635, 636 (C. Adams ed. 1854) (letter of Adams to Benjamin Rush of Aug. 28.
1811). Jefferson feared a future America shorn of Christian morality. W. BERNS, TIlE FiRsr
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 31 (1976). Finally. the Rev. Isaac
Backus, endorsing the animating impulse of Puritan establishments, said that religion "keeps alive
the best sense of moral obligation. . . . The fear and reverence of God, and the terrors of eternity
are the most powerful restraints upon the minds of men. And hence it is of special importance in a
free government .... ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH. STATE, AND CALVINts 353 (W.G. Mc-
Loughlin ed. 1968) (quoting Phillips Payson) (quoted In SMITH, supra note 37, at 20).
44. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L REV. 1680. 1684 (1969).
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IV. THE FRAMERS' VISION REFLECTED IN EARLY LEGISLATION
The framers' vision is reflected in two great early American legis-
lative traditions. First, given the identification of Protestantism with re-
publican government, Roman Catholics were often objects of discrimi-
nation. The Church of Rome was not only viewed as a grand spiritual
conspiracy against Protestantism, it was seen as politically subversive
as well. 45 The perception was not without foundation. 6 One solution to
the Catholic problem was to do everything possible to keep Catholics
out of the United States. A more moderate approach was instead
adopted by virtually all of the states: exclude Catholics from public
office, the franchise, or both.47 Another response was to admit
Catholics to the body politic in full confidence that they would not long
remain Catholic. Formal conversion was not important, so long as the
individual Romanist was sufficiently indoctrinated.48 The common un-
45. Roger Sherman's biographer records his subject's "abhorrence" of the Catholic Church as
partly a product of his faith in the new republic, which was founded on Christianity as he under-
stood it. R. BOARDMAN. ROGER SHERMAN SIGNER AND STATESMAN 103 (1938). See also J.
PRATT. RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE THEME IN NEw YORK His-
TORY 85 (1967). Indeed, for both Sherman and Rufus King, the identity of Christianity-as they
understood it-and America produced hostility to Anglicanism as well. See R. BOARDMAN, supra
at 319; 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 95 (C. King ed. 1894) (letter of
Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry of May 9, 1785). Upon hearing of Bishop Scabury's appointment to
the American Episcopacy, King wrote to Elbridge Gerry in critical terms that no doubt would
have applied to the Roman Catholic Church. "I never wished to see the lawn sleeves in
America. . . I never liked the hierarchy of the Church-an equality in the teachers of Religion,
and a dependence on the people, are Republican sentiments .. " Id. Paine Wingate, a delegate
to the Fourteenth Continental Congress under the Confederation and Senator from New Hamp-
shire in the first and second Congress under the Constitution, recalled a lecture given by Professor
Wigglesworth while he was a student at Harvard:
[The Catholic] church is a restless, incroaching and implacable enemy to Protestants of
every denomination. It is indefatigable in its endeavors, compassing land and sea to make
proselytes. It utterly denies salvation to any out of its communion. And its heresies, su-
perstitions, cruelties, idolatries, and other crying wickcdnesses are such, that you will find
it no very easy matter to persuade yourselves that there can be any salvation in it.
I C. WINGATE. LIFE AND LETTERS OF PAINE WINGATE 62 (1930).
46. An 1832 encyclical letter of Pope Gregory summarized the Church's teaching on, or more
precisely, its disdain for, religious freedom: "From that polluted fountain of indifference flows that
absurd and erroneous doctrine," liberty of conscience. J.F. BERG, CHURCH AND STATE: OR ROME'S
INFLUENCE UPON THE CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF OUR COUNTRY 30 (1851). From
that statement, one American, Reverend J.F. Berg of Philadelphia, concluded that "[t]he pontiff
is clearly committed against the first principles of American freedom and regards them as unmiti-
gated abominations." Id.
47. Id. at 169-70.
48. Reverend Lyman Beecher articulated the American response to Catholics in terms that
have since dominated this country's historical treatment of immigrant groups:
Let the Catholics mingle with us as Americans and come with their children under the
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derpinning of the various alternatives was the "indelible fusion" of
Protestantism and republican government; thus the obvious dissonance
between Catholicism and Protestantism implied incompatibility be-
tween American citizenship and Catholic devotion.
The second great legislative attempt to perpetuate the prevailing
Protestantism of America's founding generation was the establishment
of post-Revolutionary "common" (or primary level) schools. In the pe-
riod immediately after the War of Independence, the importance of ed-
ucation in fostering religious and republican values was second perhaps
only to that of the family.49 Public education not only inculcated read-
ing, writing, and arithmetic, but fostered religious and moral virtue; the
educator was critically significant in shaping and inspiring the new
American heart. At the core, this vision embodied a belief that religion
had: (1) social utility-the preservation of republican order through
brotherly love; and (2) importance for the individual-the salvation of
the soul through union with God achieved by reading of the scrip-
tures.5 0 The notion of a pious, literate population imbibed with the light
of both gospel and reason, and vigilant of its freedom of conscience in
the new republic, was well articulated by 1780.
Public statements and legislative pronouncements by the
lawmakers of the era make it clear that electoral success demanded
recognition of religion and morality as cardinal elements in a proper
education. 51 The purposes of higher education were similarly defined.
full action of our common schools and republican institutions and the various powers of
assimilation and we are prepared cheerfully to abide the consequences ... If they could
read the Bible. . . their darkened intellect would brighten and if they dared to think for
themselves, the contrast of Protestant independence with their thraldom, would awaken
the desire of equal privileges and put an end to an arbitrary clerical dominion over trem-
bling superstitious minds.
L. BEECHER. PLEA FOR THE WEST 63, 128 (1835).
49. L. CREMIN. AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 1783-1876 at 116
(1980). In Cremin's view:
The republican style in American education was compounded of four fundamental be-
liefs: that education was crucial to the vitality of the Republic; that a proper republican
education consisted of the diffusion of knowledge, the nurturance of virtue (including
patriotic civility), and the cultivation of learning; that schools and colleges were the best
agencies for providing a proper republican education on the scale required; and that the
most effective means of obtaining the requisite number and kind of schools and colleges
was through some system tied to the polity.
Id. at 148.
50. See M. SAVELLE, SEEDS OF LIBERTY: THE GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN MIND 267-73
(1965). See also CREMIN, supra note 49, at 107-14, 116-211.
51. For example, the Massachusetts legislature in 1789 codified its views in "An Act to pro-
vide for the Instruction of Youth, and for the Promotion of good Education." I LAWS OF MAss.
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This was a time when almost all of the great private col-
leges-Harvard, Yale, and Princeton among them-were publicly sup-
ported and were still primarily true seminaries. But state universities
also had a religious mission. 2
Both the practice and theory of education thus conformed to the
framers' vision. Public schools-those wholly funded and administered
by the state-were concentrated in New England and bore the stamp
of Congregational hegemony.5 3 There, the early national Puritan tradi-
tion meant that children needed literacy both to read the Bible and to
run commerce. Massachusetts, for example, mandated in 1789 that
every town of fifty households or more was required to provide a
469, 473 (1780-1805) ("it shall be the duty of such Master ... to instill in their minds a sense of
piety and virtue, and to teach them decent behaviour."). See also CREMIN, supra note 49, at 153.
Georgia Governor Lyman Hall, in his 1783 Message to the Legislature, said:
Every encouragement ought to be given to introduce religion and learned clergy to per-
form divine worship in honor of God and to cultivate principles of religion and virtue
among our citizens. For this purpose it will be your wisdom to lay an early foundation for
endowing seminaries of learning: nor can you, I conceive, lay better than by a grant of
land that may, as in other governments, hereafter, by lease or otherwise, raise a sufficient
revenue to support such valuable institutions.
H. WHITE, ABRAHAM BALDWIN at 154 (1926).
Newspaper accounts for the years 1789-1790 further reveal a reading and voting public inter-
ested in the sectarian purposes of education. A letter to the editor of the Columbia Centinel
described the utilitarian value of instructing Negro children at government expense; schooling in
the principles of religion and morality was "the best security for their industry and honesty."
Columbia Centinel, June 26, 1790. The Pennsylvania Observer advised in 1790 that public sup-
port of schools for "children of poor people" would insure that "they will never be the instruments
of injuring mankind." Pennsylvania Observer, Jan. 27, 1790. The printer of a newly published
Independent Catechism heralded it in a long Boston Gazette advertisement as an instructional
book for both home and schools. The printer declared that such a catechism was especially desira-
ble under the new republican form of government in that "particular attention ought to be paid to
the religious education of youth-without virtue and piety we never can look for a good adminis-
tration of government, or for happy and prosperous times." Boston Gazette, Feb. 24. 1789. See
also R. MOHL, EDUCATION AS SOCIAL CONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY. 1784-1825 (1111); 51 NEW
YORK HISTORY 219 (1970).
52. In establishing a "State University" in 1785, the Georgia legislature declared that a free
government
can only be happy where the public principles and Opinions are properly directed and
their manners regulated. This is an influence beyond the Stretch of Laws and punish-
ments and can be claimed only by Religion and Education. It should therefore be among
the first objects of those who wish well to the National prosperity to encourage and sup-
port the principles of religion and morality, and early to place the Youth under the form-
ing hand of security, that by Instruction they may be molded to the love of Virtue and
good order."
R. STRICKLAND. RELIGION AND THE STATE IN GEORGIA IN THE 18TH CENTURY 178 (1939).
53. See C. KINNEY, CHURCH & STATE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SEPARATION IN NEW HAMPSIRE.
1630-1900. at 152 (1955); R.J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION. 1775-1818, at 192-95
(1918).
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schoolmaster, certified by the town selectman and a local minister, and
authorized all parishes and precincts to raise taxes to carry out this
duty.5 New Hampshire also passed a comprehensive school act in 1789
requiring that schoolmasters be certified by what amounted to the local
clergyman. 55 The law authorized town selectmen to tax residents for
school purposes, and the assessment was clearly intended to serve reli-
gious ends."6 In Connecticut 7 and Rhode Island,8 8 schools were appar-
54. See supra note 51. The town of Boston adopted a proposal in 1789 for the creation of a
System of Education open to all students who possessed the ability to read and spell. The Bible
and other texts were specifically listed for use in the Reading classes. S. SCHuLTz. THE CULTURE
FACTORY: BoSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS. 1789-1860, at 13-15 (1973). The School Committee of Bos-
ton determined four weeks after passage of the school plan that the schoolmasters had "the indis-
pensable duty. . . daily to commence the duties of their office by prayer, and reading a portion of
the sacred scriptures, at the hour assigned for opening the School in the Morning; and close the
same in the evening with prayer." Massachusetts Centinel. Jan. 9. 1790. at 1. The same commit-
tee two weeks later enacted a measure that was an apparent attempt to assure parents that the
particular doctrines of the Congregational Church would not be foisted on children of other Prot-
estant denominations. The committee voted that "the several School-Masters instruct the Children
under their care, or cause them to be instructed in the Assemblies' Catechism, every Saturday,
unless the parents request that they be taught any particular Catechism of the religious Society to
which they belong; and the Masters are directed to teach such children accordingly." Id. At stake
was not "religion" in the public schools, for it was inconceivable that religion should not be there;
religion was a raison d'etre of the schools in the first place. "Sectarianism" was the issue. With
Massachusetts as a case study, one can see how the fight to keep preference of any sect out of the
public schools was compatible with and even propelled by a desire to keep religion in the schools.
In the process one can see the reflection of disestablishment; sectarian squabbles and preferences
had no place in public America, but public support of nondenominational religion 'as vital to the
country's survival. In 1827, Massachusetts passed a comprehensive school code providing "that
said [district school] committee shall never direct any school books to be purchased or used, in
any of the schools under their superintendence, which are calculated to favor any particular reli-
gious sect or tenet." LAws OF MAss. ch. 143, § 7 (1827).
55. LAWS OF NEw HAMPSHIRE, V, 449 (Batchellor 1776-1835). See also KINNEY, supra note
53, at 152-53.
56. This was evident from an early description of the curriculum:
The text-books for many years were few in number and scarcely any two like, except the
Testament and the Psalter, which were used for reading and spelling in the more ad-
vanced classes. The New England Primer was about the only book used by the younger
pupils. They contained . . . the Shorter Catechism, "Prayers for the Young," general
rules to incline children to lead pious lives, and religious verses like the "Cradle Hymn"
of Dr. Watts . . . .The Catechism was the most distinguishing feature of the book. A
preface to the reprint . . . says: "Our Puritan Fathers brought the Shorter Catechism
with them, across the ocean, and laid it on the same shelf with the family Bible. They
taught it diligently to their children every Sabbath."
J. LYFORD. HISTORY OF CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE 1I, at 1218 (1896).
57. See R.J. PURCELL, supra note 53, at 914-95.
58. In libertarian Rhode Island. Providence public school teachers in 1820 received the follow-
ing injunction from the governing school committee:
That they endeavor to impress on the minds of the scholars a sense of the Being &
Providence of God & their obligations to love & reverence Him,-their duty to their
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ently structured in a very similar fashion to their Puritan neighboring
states.
Of the middle colonies, New York was the most active proponent
of public education in the early national period.89 The educational
practices of the period in New York make it clear that common, or
primary, schools were used for the dissemination of religion and moral-
ity, and that the Bible and Christian moral principles were the instruc-
tional vehicles. 60 At the same time, sectarianism had no place in public
education.6 1 In the remaining middle colonies-Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Delaware-very few public schools existed in 1789. The
extant primary schools were usually charity schools run by parishes as
part of their duty for orphans.62 Pennsylvania, however, was quite busy
establishing and supporting various sectarian colleges.6 3
Education further south was largely a haphazard affair. 64 The sit-
parents & preceptors, the beauty & excellency of truth, justice & mutual love, tenderness
to brute creatures, the happy tendency of self government and obedience to the dictates
of reason & religion; the observance of the Sabbath as a sacred institution, the duty
which they owe to their country & the necessity of a strict obedience to its Laws, and
that they caution them against the prevailing vices.
W. DUNN. WHAT HAPPENED TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? 71 (1958).
59. 1782 LAWS OF N.Y. ch. 22, art. 7, 432, 435. See also G. MILLER. THE ACADEMY SYSTEM
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 27-28 (1982) (reserving four hundred acres of frontier land for
schools: four hundred were also reserved for "support of the gospel"). The statute was supple-
mented by further acts in 1786 LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 67, 334, 339; 1790 LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 38, 162;
1801 LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 126, 299; and 1813 LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 187, 290.
60. G. CHEEVER, RIGHT OF THE BIBLE IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 201-13 (1854). Griffin notes
that the "Bible-in-the-Schools" movement was part of the anti-Catholic movement in the mid-
nineteenth century. GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 140-42.
61. In 1854, an educational theorist contended that the King James Bible was nonsectarian,
although the burgeoning Catholic population disagreed. CHEEVER, supra note 60, at 201-13.
George B. Cheever prefaced this claim by declaring that "while it is essential to forbid sectarian-
ism in the public schools, it is as essential to bring them under the teachings and power of true
religion; that religion should not be driven out under cover of repelling sectarianism," Id. at 37-38.
Cheever's statements reflected what enlightened New Yorkers had believed since the Revolution:
that the fostering of Protestantism without sectarian particulars was an inevitable activity of any
government, even one that had disestablished religion. SMITH, supra note 37, at 108.
62. N. BURR, EDUCATION IN NEW JERSEY 1630-1871 at 240-245 (1942). The exception was
western New Jersey. Quakers there operated common schools supported by local taxation similar
to the New England model. Some towns in eastern New Jersey apparently were empowered to
operate tax supported schools if they so chose; yet little or no evidence can be found that these
townspeople did so. D. SLOAN, EDUCATION IN NEW JERSEY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 7
(1975).
63. 1 PENNSYLVANIA LAWS 474 (Nov. 27, 1779); II PENNSYLVANIA LAWS 500 (Sept. 9, 1793);
Id. at 398 (March 10, 1787).
64. Maryland had long ago established Protestant common schools. P. CLARKSON AND R.S,
JErT. LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 19-21 (1111). Schooling in pre-Revolutionary North Caro-
lina was essentially a church affair. Conklin, The Church Establishment in North Carolina, 42
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uation in Virginia is particularly instructive, because the history of
public education in that state presents an incongruous combination of
disestablishment policy on the one hand and religious entanglement on
the other. After control of the charity schools had been wrested from
the Episcopal Church,6 5 the legislature in 1796 passed an act that ena-
bled counties to establish tuition-free schools.66 Nevertheless, by 1809
no county had opened a free school under the 1796 enabling legisla-
tion.67 Instead, the local citizenry sought charters from the state for the
funding of private schools6" such as the Hampden-Sidney Academy.
Although the Academy received an incorporating charter in 1783 that
dissolved all connection between the school and the parent presbytery,
the predominant influence in the school continued to be Presbyterian.69
Similarly, Protestant Episcopalians remained active in education during
the period, serving as instructors and trustees in at least three state-
chartered academies.7 0 The Methodists also maintained three schools,
all of which apparently had a highly religious orientation.7 '
This historical evidence demonstrates that the nonestablishment
home of Jefferson and Madison supported and subsidized sectarian
schools. Given the heavy reliance in Everson v. Board of Education on
the situation in Virginia,7 2 this evidence should rebut the conclusion in
that case that public education was independent of religion during the
founding era. Rather, the truly vast extent of the religious influence on
public education in the early national period should prove that the
framers simply did not intend to erect a "wall of separation" between
church and state.
N.C. His. REV. 20 (1955) and the few academies chartered after disestablishment suggest a con-
tinued "religious" presence in the school. Id. at 20-21. See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EDUCA-
TION IN THE SOUTH 12-15 (E. Knight ed. 1953). South Carolina did not enact a significant state-
wide education bill until 1811. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EDCUATrON IN THE SOUTH BEFORE
1860 at 156 (E. Knight ed. 1953). Schools in Georgia were more often than not run by clergy. See
supra note 51.
65. See S. BELL., THE CHURCH. THE STATE. AND EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 159 (1930).
66. Id. at 167.
67. Id. at 169.
68. See id. at 210-43.
69. Id. at 221.
70. Id. at 210-14.
71. Id. at 214-20. Further evidence of state involvement in religious education is the Virginia
Sunday School movement of the 1820s. Id. at 246. Sunday Schools were non-denominational Prot-
estant enterprises designed to impart a "Christian education" to their pupils. Id. at 249. Direct
financial aid was provided through a state-established fund. The state also set up a Literary Fund
intended to promote state-wide education. Id. at 24849.




What the framers intended to achieve through the establishment
clause was that no one religious sect should ever be preferred by gov-
ernment over another. The Supreme Court, however, through the doc-
trine of Everson,7 3 has eschewed the plain and universally understood
meaning of the clause, and has created a general prohibition on any
nondiscriminatory aid to religion.
In developing the Everson doctrine, the Court has certainly not
bolstered such first amendment values as "neutrality,"' 4 "separation, ' 75
or "voluntarism. 178 Nor have they achieved fidelity to the framers by
focusing on the perceived evils of religious establishment. 7 While such
a focus is vital to an accurate interpretation of the words of the estab-
lishment clause, the framers' remedy for whatever evils might exist was
equal treatment of all religious sects. The Court has not seen fit to
implement that solution. Rather, the Court has "carved out what [it
has] deemed to be the most desirable national policy governing various
aspects of church-state relations.
'7 8
Whether or not the Court will someday decide to adopt the fram-
ers' view of nonestablishment is pure conjecture. We may at least hope
that the Court will give the plain meaning of the establishment clause a
fairer hearing than it did in Everson. The Court might well consider
the counsel of Jefferson, who stressed that the meaning of the Constitu-
tion is "to be found in the explanations of those who advocated it, upon
which the people relied in adopting the Constitution. ' 9 Or perhaps
73. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
74. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1684 (1969); Van
AIstyne, Comment: Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson s Crumbling Wall-A Comment
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L. J. 770, 774-76 (1984); Comment, Beyond Seeger/Welsh:
Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 973, 975 n.12 (1982).
75. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 698 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Van Alstyne, supra note 74, at 776-78; Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do
Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the Establishment Clause?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 539 (1982).
76. Everson 330 U.S. at 18; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (1984) (Brennan J., dissenting); Roemer
v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963); Van Alstyne, supra note 74.
77. The Court's perception of these evils is evident in the adoption and continued application
of the three-pronged establishment clause test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
78. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
79. 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446 (2d ed. 1836); see also R. BERGER. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 138
(1974).
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Madison should have the last word after all. For he said that if the
"4sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Na-
tion. . . be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for
a consistent and stable government, more than for a faithful exercise of
its powers."80
80. 4 J. MADISON: LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 191 (Lippingott ed. 1865-1867). See also
BERGER, supra note 79, at 138 n.104.
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